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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW COMMERCE CLAUSE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION JURISDICTION OVER INTRASTATE COMMERCE AFFECTING
INTERSTATE COMMERCE - Appellee, an Illinois corporation engaged in manufacturing and selling candy within the state of Illinois, used in marketing its
product a method of "break and take" packages involving an element of chance.
The Federal Trade Commission had found that this practice constituted "unfair
competition" and had ordered one hundred twenty of appellee's competitors
who were engaged in interstate commerce to cease using it. The commission
issued a like order against appellee on the theory that its activities, although
wholly intrastate, "affected" interstate commerce. Appellee appealed from the
order, contending that the Federal Trade Commission Act did not authorize
the commission to regulate wholly intrastate business. Held, order set aside.
Congress in granting the commission authority to prevent unfair methods of
competition "in commerce" did not extend such authority to methods which
merely "affected" interstate commerce. Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte
Bros., (U.S. 1941) 6r S. Ct. 580.
In view of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court extending the power
of Congress under the commerce clause to businesses merely affecting interstate
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commerce,1 it would seem entirely possible for the Court to interpret section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act 2 in the same liberal manner. However,
the Federal Trade Commission has never been a tribunal favored by the courts,8
and this may serve to explain the restrictive interpretation of the statute in this
case. Certainly, if the Court had desired to reach the opposite conclusion, it
would not have found authority lacking. It is true that some of the earlier
decisions defining commerce as used in this act confined the term to its narrowest limits.4 In addition, the lower federal courts have held that the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission does not extend to intrastate commerce which merely affects interstate commerce.G But contrary argument by
analogy is to be found in the doctrine of the Minnesota Rate Cases and the
1 National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S.
1, 57 S. Ct. 615 (1937); National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S.
601, 59 S. Ct. 668 (1939); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. I, 59 S. Ct. 379 (1939);
United States v. F. W. Darby Lumber Co., (U. S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 451.
2
"Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.
"The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations .•• from using unfair methods of competition in commerce
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce." 38 Stat. L. 719 (1914), 15
U. S. C. (1934), § 45, as amended, 52 Stat. L. III (1938), 15 U. S. C. (Supp.
1939), § 45.
3 From the beginning the courts placed definite limitations on the powers of the
Federal Trade Commission, although the present tendency is to weaken the effect
of these restrictive decisions. See Federal Trade Commission v. Raymond Bros.-Clark
Co., 263 U.S. 565, 44 S. Ct. 162 (1924), affirming the dicta in Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 40 S. Ct. 572 (1920), to the effect that the jurisdiction of the commission extended only to restraints of trade, monopoly, and practices
which prior to 1914 had been considered deceptive or fraudulent [but cf. Federal
Trade Commission v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U. S. 304, 54 S. Ct. 423 (1934)];
Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U. S. 568, 43 S. Ct. 210
(1923), allowing strict judicial review of the commission's findings of fact [hut
cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 54 S. Ct. 315
(1934)]; Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 280 U. S. 19, 50 S. Ct. I (1929),
requiring that proceedings be in the public interest; Federal Trade Commission v.
Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 51 S. Ct. 587 (1931), limiting the power to forbid false
advertising to cases where injury is sustained by an honest competitor [hut see:
Wheeler-Lea Act, 52 Stat. L. III (1938), 15 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), §§ 41 et seq.].
4
Ward Baking Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (C. C. A. 2d, 1920) 264 F.
330; Winslow v. Federal Trade Commission, (C. C. A. 4th, 1921) 277 F. 206; both
criticized in Hankin, "The Jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission," 12 CAL.
L. REv. 179 at 190 ff. (1924).
G Canfield Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (C. C. A. 6th, 1921) 274 F.
571; Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) 22
F. (2d) 122; California Rice Industry v. Federal Trade Commission, (C. C. A. 9th,
1939) 102 F. (2d) 716. However, it is interesting to note that in the Canfield Oil
case the court in refusing to apply the doctrine of the Minnesota Rate Cases (see note
6, infra) approaches the question whether commerce affecting interstate commerce is
within the commission's jurisdiction as one of degree. This suggests that on the proper
facts the court would have allowed jurisdiction to the commission.
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Shreveport case, which held that the Interstate Commerce Commission might
regulate intrastate carrier rates where they affected interstate rates fixed by the
commission. 6 Furthermore, the decisions which have held the terms of the
Sherman Act applicable to intrastate activities affecting interstate commerce 1
would seem to indicate that the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission
might be at least as broad, since one of the duties of · the commission is to
administer portions of the Sherman Act. 8 Moreover, it has been held that the
Federal Trade Commission does have such jurisdiction when administering the
Sherman Act. 9 In the principal case, however, the Court, by confining the
commission to the narrow limits of the statutory lahguage, is seeking to effect
a public policy by restraining a federal agency from exercising a "pervasive
control over myriads of local businesses in matters heretofore traditionally left
to local custom or local law." 10 That there is such a public policy cannot be
doubted, but at the same time the very practical problem raised by the facts
of the instant case is not readily settled by reliance upon local law. If the Court
had granted jurisdiction in this case, it would have raised a difficult question of
degree as to the kinds of acts that affect interstate commerce. At the same time,
however, cases involving gross discrimination against interstate commerce
would have been brought within the pale of regulation.
John C. Johnston
6

Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 33 S. Ct. 729 (1912); Houston, E. &
W. T. Ry. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342, 34 S. Ct. 833 (1913). In view of the
Court's reliance in the principal case upon the absence of express statutory language
granting jurisdiction over activities affecting interstate commerce, it is to be noted that
the act creating the Interstate Commerce Commission contained an express proviso to
the effect that the commission should not have jurisdiction over carriers engaged in
carrying wholly within one state. 24 Stat. L. 379 (1887) and amendment of 1906, 34
Stat. L. 584. Yet, the Court in the Minnesota Rate and Shreveport cases interpreted
this proviso so as to allow the commission to take jurisdiction over intrastate rates affecting interstate rates. It was not until 1920 that the act was amended so as expressly
to authorize this jurisdiction. 41 Stat. L. 484 (1920), 49 U. S. C. (1934), § 13 (4).
1 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 25 S. Ct. 276 (1905); United
States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525, 33 S. Ct. 141 (1913); United Mine Workers of
America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 S. Ct. 570 (1922); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 51 S. Ct. 421 (1931); Local 167, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U. S. 293, 54 S. Ct. 396 (1934);
C. E. Stevens Co. v. Foster & Kleiser Co., 311 U.S. 255, 61 S. Ct. 210 (1940).
8
Because of the fact that the Federal Trade Commission was given power to
enforce certain provisions of the Sherman Act, and because the policy of the Sherman
Act has determined what constitutes "unfair methods of competition" within the
meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act, it was urged in the dissenting opinion
that for the purposes of the present case the two statutes should be construed together
as parts of an "integrated statutory scheme." In United States v. Hutcheson, (U. S.
1941) 61 S. Ct. 463, the Court had done just this with the Sherman Act, Clayton
Act, and Norris-LaGuardia Act in order to deny statutory grounds for criminal prosecution under the Sherman Act in a labor dispute. It is interesting to note that Justice
Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion· in both cases.
9
Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. Federal Trade Commission, (C. C. A.
8th, 1926) 13 F. (2d) 673.
·
10
Principal case, 61 S. Ct. 580 at 583.

